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Rao Radhika
Assisted Reproductive Technology and the
Threat to the Traditional Family
by
RADiiiA 1 o*
Society is currently undergoing a reproductive revolution.
Grandmothers may now give birth to their own grandchildren.1 Bat-
tles for custody may take place between a child's two biological
mothers.2 And families may be formed by means of the commercial
exchange of reproductive goods and services in the marketplace,
rather than the loving interchange of those entwined in close
relationships.
Professor John Robertson enthusiastically embraces the technol-
ogies that make all of these developments possible. Advocating the
presumptive primacy of procreative liberty, he concludes that almost
every practice necessary to procreate should receive constitutional
protection.3 Professor Dorothy Roberts is more skeptical of the bene-
fits to result from the new reproduction. Although these technologies
may enhance individual liberty, she demonstrates that they also reflect
and reinforce racial hierarchy.4
These two scholars approach the reproductive revolution from
very different angles, but in one critical respect they arrive at the same
* Associate Professor, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. This
is a written version of a talk presented at the Hastings Law Journal's symposium Changing
Conception/Challenging Conceptions: Exploring the Impact of New Reproductive Technol-
ogies on Our Society. Thanks are due to the participants for their insightful comments and
to Herb Williams for the grace with which he shepherded me through the editing process.
1. John D. Battersby, South Africa Woman Gives Birth to 3 Grandchildren, and His-
tory, N.Y. TnMms, Oct. 2, 1987, at A9.
2. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1992) (custody dispute between genetic
parents and gestational surrogate).
3. John Robertson, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Family, 47 HASTIns
L.J. - (1996) [hereinafter Robertson, Assisted Reproductive Technology]. See also John
Robertson, CHILDREN OF CHoicn: FREEDoM AND THE NEw REPRODUCrIVE TECHNOLO-
Gins (1994) [hereinafter Robertson, CHILDREN OF CHoIcE]. For an extended critique of
the constitutional basis and extent of Robertson's principle of procreative liberty, see
Radhika Rao, Constitutional Misconceptions, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1473 (1995).
4. See Dorothy Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 935
(1996). See also Dorothy Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. Cma. L. REv. 209 (1995).
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result. Both Roberts and Robertson believe that assisted reproduc-
tive technologies are essentially conservative: instead of threatening
traditional families, these technologies merely replicate them, al-
lowing infertile couples to create biologically-related children.
There is much truth to this view. In the short run, it is clear that
courts and legislatures are straining to squeeze technologically-formed
families into the traditional pattern. Ultimately, however, assisted re-
productive technologies possess the potential to undermine the tradi-
tional paradigm in three fundamental and possibly far-reaching ways.
First, these technologies threaten the traditional understanding of
families as the mere reflection of biological facts, revealing that they
are instead the product of social choices. Second, assisted reproduc-
tive technologies destroy the traditional opposition between the realm
of family and the realm of market. And, in so doing, these technolo-
gies promote a world of private ordering, where family ties are not
automatically assigned by biology, but are instead a matter of individ-
ual choice, and thus contingent and revocable.
1. Professor Roberts
I begin with three reflections-friendly amendments to Professor
Roberts' argument. After that, I will offer a broader response. On
the whole, I find Professor Roberts' arguments to be quite convincing.
I agree that assisted reproductive technologies both reflect and rein-
force racial hierarchy in all the ways that she has detailed.5 Many of
the inequalities that Professor Roberts describes, however, are not a
product of the technologies themselves, but rather of background ine-
qualities that pervade our society. Thus the maldistribution of as-
sisted reproductive technology, to the extent that it merely mirrors
existing inequality, is no more troubling than the maldistribution of
any valuable resource.
But there is a way in which disparities in the distribution of as-
sisted reproductive technology are uniquely troubling, and that is their
potential to exacerbate inequality. Some of these technologies may
eventually enable the creation and selection of offspring with those
traits that society deems desirable, granting the power to produce "de-
signer children.' '6 Already, preimplantation diagnosis permits couples
5. See Id.
6. Such technologies include genetic screening, gene therapy, and cloning. I use the
term genetic screening broadly to encompass carrier testing of adults, prenatal screening of
fetuses, and preimplantation diagnosis of embryos. See generally John Robertson, The Po-
tential Impact of the Human Genome Project on Procreative Liberty, in Gene Mapping 215
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47
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who possess the genes for Tay Sachs disease, cystic fibrosis, muscular
dystrophy, and hemophilia to genetically screen and selectively im-
plant embryos that are free from those traits, resulting in the birth of
healthy children.7 As the mapping of the human genome proceeds
apace, new reproductive technologies may ultimately make it possible
to select for many other offspring traits as well, such as alcoholism,
Alzheimer's disease, breast cancer, manic depression, musical ability,
obesity, and even sexual orientation.8 By allowing those who are rich
and powerful to pass on genetic privileges to their progeny in
perpetuity, however, these technologies risk creating entrenched caste
hierarchies.9 In Plyler v. Doe,10 the Supreme Court expressed concern
(George Annas & Sherman Elias eds., 1992) [hereinafter Robertson, Human Genome Pro-
ject] (describing carrier testing, prenatal screening, and preimplantation diagnosis). Gene
therapy comprises genetic interventions at both the somatic and germ line levels. Somatic
gene therapy is limited to the individual patient, but germline gene therapy involves ge-
netic alterations that affect progeny. See Sherman Elias & George Annas, Somatic and
Germline Gene Therapy, in GEm MAPPING 144 (George Annas & Sherman Elias eds.,
1992). The effects of such technologies may be compounded by the use of cloning to pro-
duce multiple copies of embryos deemed desirable. See Gina Kolata, Cloning Human Em-
bryos: Debate Erupts Over Ethics, N.Y. TIMS, Oct. 26, 1993, at Al, B7.
7. See eg., Healthy Baby is Born After Test to Screen Out Deadly Gene, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 28, 1994, at A12; Marilyn Moysa, Critics Fear Embryo Testing Could Be Abused, THE
OrAWA CrIzEN, Nov. 29, 1993; Cell Testing Finds Abnormality Early, THm SAN DIEGO
UNioN-TRmuNE, Oct. 21, 1992, at E4.
8. See Michael J. Malinowski, Coming Into Being, 45 HASTINGs L.J. 1435, 1444
(1994) ("Within several years, prenatal tests may be widely available to identify predisposi-
tions for alcoholism, Alzheimer's disease, arthritis, various cancers, dementia, diabetes,
dyslexia, glaucoma, heart disease, hypertension, manic depression, schizophrenia, and fun-
damental personality characteristics such as sexual orientation."); Sandra Blakeslee, Per-
fect Pitch: The Key May Lie in the Genes, N.Y. TMms, Nov. 20, 1990, at C6 (describing the
identification of a single gene for perfect pitch, which is thought to correlate with musical
ability); Geoffrey Cowley & Elizabeth Leonard, Made to Order Babies, NEWSWEEK, Win-
ter 1990/Spring 1991, at 94 (noting that "stuttering, obesity, and reading disorders are all
traceable to genetic markers").
9. The U.S. experience with eugenic sterilization illustrates the danger of discrimina-
tory exercise of the power to manipulate reproduction. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200,207
(1927) (upholding Virginia law authorizing sterilization of mentally retarded persons in
state institutions because:
It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring
for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who
are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The principle that sustains com-
pulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cutting the Fallopian tubes. Three
generations of imbeciles are enough.).
In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), the Supreme Court referred to this
problem when it stated:
Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of
the race. The power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and
devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types which are
inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear.
April 1996]
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about the denial of public education to illegal alien children because
this might "promote the creation and perpetuation of a subclass of
illiterates within our boundaries." But if educational inequalities are
troubling because they could perpetuate a caste system, then what
about genetic inequalities?
Professor Roberts also relies upon the distinction between nega-
tive and positive rights to support her argument that the government
need not affirmatively assist the fertility industry. I would like to
sketch out this argument a little further and also point out that the line
between negative and positive procreative rights is less clear than it
might appear. The abortion funding cases" demonstrate that recogni-
tion of a negative right to procreate does not imply a positive right to
call upon the state for assistance in procreation. Therefore, even if
there is a constitutional right to be free from state interference with
the use of reproductive technology, 12 it does not follow that the state
possesses an affirmative obligation to furnish reproductive goods or
services to those who cannot afford their high price.
But I think it is possible to take Professor Roberts' argument one
step further. If government need not supply the financial resources
necessary to exercise the right to procreate, then it is not clear why
government must supply the legal resources necessary to exercise the
right either. Thus, there is a good argument that courts can refuse to
enforce procreative contracts and legislatures can decline to enact the
legal infrastructure necessary to engage in these technologies. 13 Of
Although the Court was alluding to the problem of governmental power, disparities in
private power to select offspring traits also threaten principles of equality.
10. 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (striking down Texas statute denying free public education to
illegal alien children as a violation of the constitutional guarantee of Equal Protection).
11. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (holding that the constitu-
tional right to an abortion does not impose an affirmative obligation upon the government
to provide the financial resources necessary to exercise the right by subsidizing abortions
because, "although government may not place obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise
of her freedom of choice, it need not remove those not of its own creation."); Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977) (holding that the constitutional right to an abortion is
only a negative "right protect[ing] the woman from ... interference with her freedom to
decide whether to terminate her pregnancy. It implies no limitation on the authority of a
State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement that
judgment by the allocation of public funds.").
12. Professor Robertson is the best known proponent of the view that there exists a
negative constitutional right to procreate by means of assisted reproductive technology.
See e.g., Robertson, CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 3. For the views of one skeptic
regarding the constitutional basis and extent of this right, see Rao, supra note 3, at 1484-85.
13. More than one court has refused to enforce a surrogacy contract under this ration-
ale. See, e.g., Doe v. Kelley, 307 N.W.2d 438 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that the fun-
damental right to bear or beget a child was not infringed by the state's refusal to enforce a
[Vol. 47
HeinOnline -- 47 Hastings L.J. 954 1995-1996
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
course, the problem with this argument is that the characterization of
procreative rights as "negative" or "positive" win always depend upon
the baseline against which government action is measured. 14
Finally, Professor Roberts strives to envision a new model of
rights-one that takes into account the experiences of the dis-
empowered. One way to reconceive the model of rights is to recog-
nize that assisted reproductive technology involves many, often
conflicting constitutional rights, and to respect the constitutional
rights of each of the different parties involved.1 5 In the typical surro-
gacy contract, for example, the surrogate mother promises, in ex-
change for payment: (1) to refrain from smoking cigarettes, drinking
alcoholic beverages, or ingesting other substances that may be harm-
ful to the fetus; (2) to abort if the fetus is physiologically abnormal,
but otherwise to carry the pregnancy to term; and (3) to relinquish her
parental rights to the resulting child after birth.16 Such a contract
clearly involves conflicting rights. If a court holds that the infertile
couple's right to procreate requires enforcement of such a contract, it
will be denying the surrogate her constitutionally-protected rights to
surrogacy contract based upon state law prohibiting the payment of fees for adoption); In
re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (NJ. 1988) (holding that the right of procreation does not
require government enforcement of a surrogacy contract).
14. Like the question of whether governmental action imposes a penalty or withdraws
a subsidy, the characterization of a constitutional right as negative or positive also depends
upon the baseline against which it is measured. See, e.g., K. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Con-
ditions, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1415 (1989) (arguing that the characterization of unconstitu-
tional conditions as "coercive" is a conclusory label that draws upon a normative baseline);
Cass Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special Reference to Pornography,
Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 COLuM. L. REv. 1, 9 (1992) (arguing that "the description of
a right as positive or negative depends on the baseline").
15. In the pointed words of one California court, constitutional rights "have a way of
bumping into each other in cases involving husbands, wives, and unmarried individuals
when all are claiming parental rights." Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369, 380 (Ct.
App. 1991). See also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 316, 346 (1977)
(stating that:
[i]t is one thing to say that individuals may acquire a liberty interest against arbi-
trary governmental interference in the family-like associations into which they
have freely entered, even in the absence of biological connection or state-law
recognition of the relationship. It is quite another thing to say that one may ac-
quire such an interest in the face of another's constitutionally recognized liberty
interest that derives from blood relationship, state-law sanction, and basic human
right....);
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (rejecting the idea that it is possible to "ex-
pand a 'liberty' of sorts without contracting an equivalent 'liberty' on the other side" and
observing that, in this case, "to provide protection to an adulterous natural father is to
deny protection to a marital father, and vice versa.").
16. See Katie Marie Brophy, A Surrogate Mother Contract to Bear a Child, 20 J. FAM.
L. 263 (1982) (describing provisions of a sample surrogate mother contract).
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be free from physical invasions into her body17 and to raise her biolog-
ical child.18 Therefore, a court presented with such a contract cannot
merely consider the rights of the infertile couple in isolation. Rather,
it must take into account all of the parties involved and all of the ways
in which they experience liberty through various categories and
clauses of the Constitution. 19 Such a complete and comprehensive
mode of constitutional rights analysis would advance the process of
constructing a framework that gives voice to those who lack power.
II. Professor Robertson
Although Professors Robertson and Roberts approach these is-
sues from very different angles, they both arrive at essentially the
same result. Both Roberts20 and Robertson2' believe that assisted re-
17. A long line of cases establishes this right to freedom from physical intrusions upon
an individual's body, which I have elsewhere termed the right to privacy of person. See,
e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990) ("No right is
held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or inter-
ference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." (quoting Union
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1894))); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 764
(1984) (stating that forcible removal of a bullet from an accused person's body "would be
an 'extensive' intrusion on [his] personal privacy and bodily integrity"). See also Rao,
supra note 3, at 1488 & n. 37.
18. The right to be free from state interference with parental autonomy-which I
have elsewhere termed the right to privacy of parenting-possesses an equally ancient ped-
igree. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (requiring clear and convincing
evidence of abuse or neglect before state can constitutionally terminate parental rights);
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (invalidating statute that automatically deprived
unwed biological fathers of their children upon the mother's death); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (overturning statute requiring parents to send children to pub-
lic school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down state statute prohibiting
parents from teaching children foreign languages). See also Rao, supra note 3, at 1489 & n.
38.
19. See David Faigman, Measuring Constitutionality Transactionally, 45 HASTINGs L.J.
753 (1994) (arguing for a transactional approach to constitutional adjudication that would
require courts to aggregate constitutional rights, rather than measure liberty in a fractured
and myopic way through the constricting lenses of individual amendments).
20. In the words of Professor Roberts, the new reproductive technologies "are more
conforming than liberating: they more often reinforce the status quo than challenge it."
Roberts, supra note 4, at 935. Roberts acknowledges that these technologies possess the
potential to "free outsiders from constraints of social convention and legal restrictions,"
enabling single women, lesbians, and gay men to have children. Id. She believes, however,
that "these technologies rarely achieve their subversive potential. Id. Most often they
complete a traditional nuclear family by providing a married couple with a child. Id.
Rather than disrupt the stereotypical family, they enable infertile couples to create one."
Id
21. Professor Robertson also believes that assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs)
pose no threat to traditional conceptions of the family: "Rather than undermine or alter
[Vol. 47
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productive technologies are fundamentally conservative: instead of
threatening traditional families,22 assisted reproductive technologies
merely replicate them, allowing infertile couples to create biologically-
related children.
conceptions of the family, the demand for ARTs unfolds within the prevailing family para-
digm of couples having and rearing biologically-related offspring." Robertson, Assisted
Reproductive Technologies, supra note 3, at 927-928. Even the use of gamete donors and
surrogates, he observes, "pose[s] no threat to understandings of the family, even though
they create families in which a gamete source or even gestating mother is absent." Id.
Robertson concludes that "the overall effect [of ARTs] on the shape and conception of
family is likely to be small" for primarily two reasons:
One is that the goal of the couple using these techniques is to replicate the
coitally-conceived family as much as possible. The second is that since all of the
techniques are more closely tied to coital conception than is adoption, none of
them alone, nor all of them together, are more radical or likely to have as great an
effect on participants and offspring as adoption, which occurs much more fre-
quently and has long been assimilated into our understandings of family.
22. Although the contours of the family have varied among different social classes
and at different historical time periods, the traditional nuclear family has been the norm
throughout most of American history. See Katherine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as
an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Fam-
ily Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REv. 879, 879 n.1 (1984) ("[T]he private, largely self-contained,
marriage-centered nuclear family has been the norm throughout most of American his-
tory."); Kris Franklin, "A Family Like Any Other Family:" Alternative Methods of Defining
the Family in Law, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CaANGE 1027, 1032 (1990-91) ("Our cultural
ideology assumes that everyone should live in some form of nuclear family, and that the
nuclear family is ideally suited to modem American society."). The paradigmatic family
consists of two heterosexual, married adults and their biological or adoptive children. See
Martha Minow, All In the Family & In All Families: Membership, Loving, and Owing, 95
W. VA. L. Rnv. 275, 279 (1992-93) ("Lawful family membership traditionally depended
upon marriage, birth of a child to its biological parents, and adoption."). Indeed, this vi-
sion is so pervasive that some commentators unreflectively refer to the "traditional" family
without providing any definition of its content. See, eg., Note, Looking for a Family Re-
semblance: The Limits of the Functional approach to the Legal Definition of Family, 104
HARv. L. Rnv. 1640 (1991); Amy L. Brown, note, Broadening Anachronistic Notions of
"Family" in Proxy Decisionmaking for Unmarried Adults, 41 HASTINGs L.. 1029 (1990).
This cultural ideal continues to dominate the social and legal mythology, even though it is
at odds with the reality of most modem families. See Only One U.S. Family in Four is
"Traditional", N.Y. TnAFs, Jan. 30, 1991, at A19 (reporting that, according to the 1990
census, only 26% of the nation's households consist of two parents of the opposite sex
living together with children). At the 1981 White House Conference on Families, for ex-
ample, the National Pro-Family Coalition adopted this definition, proposing that a family
consists solely of "persons who are related by blood, marriage, or adoption." See Franklin,
supra, at 1029. And this vision of the family is arguably enshrined in the Supreme Court's
constitutional jurisprudence as well. See Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage,
Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MIcH. L.
REv. 463, 471, 491-92 (1983) (arguing that "marriage and kinship are still the touchstones
of constitutional adjudication in family-related cases" and that "the 50 or so Supreme
Court decisions that now touch on family interests effectively define a 'family' as persons
related by blood, marriage, or adoption").
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There is much truth to this view. In the short run, it is clear that
courts and legislatures are straining to squeeze these technologically-
formed families into the traditional mold. Representative of this phe-
nomenon are the state statutes that provide that the "father" of a
child created by the artificial insemination of a married woman with
donor sperm is the married woman's husband, and that the sperm do-
nor possesses no legal rights.23 By designating the husband as the
legal father and by denying the presence of the sperm provider, such
statutes attempt to shore up the traditional conception of the family.
2 4
However, revolutions do not take place in a day. Ultimately, as-
sisted reproductive technology possesses the potential to radically
destabilize and disrupt the traditional conception of the family, as is
suggested by the fact that conservative organizations such as the Cath-
olic Church are deeply opposed to almost all such technologies.25 At
23. A typical example is California Family Code section 7613, which provides:
(a) If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of her
husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man not her
husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father of a child
thereby conceived ....
(b) The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial in-
semination of a woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law as if he were
not the natural father of a child thereby conceived.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 1996). The California statute is modelled on section 5 of
the Uniform Parentage Act (1973), which has been adopted, with minor variations, in
eleven other states as well.
24. In the same vein, courts also strive to restructure the families that result from
reproductive technology so that they resemble the traditional model of just two parents of
the opposite sex. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781 (Cal. 1993) (acknowledg-
ing that child possessed two biological mothers but concluding that "for any child Califor-
nia law recognizes only one natural mother, despite advances in reproductive technology
rendering a different outcome biologically possible); Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App.
3d 386 (1986) (extending parental status to genetic father of child born of artificial insemi-
nation of unmarried woman, while denying parental status to mother's female companion
even though she participated in the conception and rearing of the child).
25. In his most recent encyclical letter "On the Value and Inviolability of Human
Life," Pope John Paul II condemned assisted reproductive technologies, stating:
The various techniques of artificial reproduction, which would seem to be at the
service of life and which are frequently used with this intention, actually open the
door to new threats against life. Apart from the fact that they are morally unac-
ceptable, since they separate procreation from the fully human context of the
conjugal act, these techniques have a high rate of failure: not just failure in rela-
tion to fertilization but with regard to the subsequent development of the em-
bryo, which is exposed to the risk of death, generally within a very short space of
time. Furthermore, the number of embryos produced is often greater than that
needed for implantation in the woman's womb, and these so-called 'spare em-
bryos' are then destroyed or used for research which, under the pretext of scien-
tific or medical progress, in fact reduces human life to the level of simple
'biological material' to be freely disposed of.
[Vol. 47
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the most obvious level, assisted reproductive technologies enable the
formation of families by gay men, lesbians, single people, and post-
menopausal women, visibly assaulting the traditional image of the
two-parent, heterosexual, biologically-connected family.2 6 But even
when employed by heterosexual married couples to produce families
identical in all outward respects to the conventional model, assisted
reproductive technologies insidiously undermine the traditional para-
digm from within in three fundamental and potentially far-reaching
ways. First, assisted reproductive technologies threaten the traditional
understanding of families as the mere reflection of biological facts,
revealing that they are instead social constructs. Second, assisted re-
productive technologies destroy the traditional opposition between
the family and the market by assembling families in the commercial
exchange of reproductive goods and services on the marketplace,
rather than forging them from the loving interchange of those en-
twined in close relationships. And, in so doing, assisted reproductive
technologies promote a world of private ordering, where family ties
are not automatically assigned by biology, but are instead a matter of
individual choice, and thus contingent and revocable.
First, assisted reproductive technologies challenge the traditional
conception of the family as a natural human formation stemming from
biological connections rather than cultural choices. The law clearly
embodies this vision of the family as a "natural" entity that is recog-
On the Value and Inviolability of Human Life, Evangelium Vitae, addressed by Pope John
Paul II, March 30, 1995, Chapter 1, paragraph 14. In the same encyclical, the Pope also
expressed reservations about prenatal diagnosis, observing:
Special attention must be given to evaluating the morality of prenatal diagnostic
techniques which enable the early detection of possible anomalies in the unborn
child.... When they do not involve disproportionate risks for the child and the
mother, and are meant to make possible early therapy or even to favor a serene
and informed acceptance of the child not yet born, these techniques are morally
licit. But since the possibilities of prenatal therapy are today still limited, it not
infrequently happens that these techniques are used with a eugenic intention
which accepts selective abortion in order to prevent the birth of children affected
by various types of anomalies. Such an attitude is shameful and utterly reprehen-
sible, since it presumes to measure the value of a human life only within the pa-
rameters of 'normality' and physical well-being, thus opening the way to
legitimizing infanticide and euthanasia as well.
Id. at Chapter I, para. 63.
26. See, e.g., Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991) (artificial insemina-
tion by donor sperm enabled lesbian woman to have a child); Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224
Cal. Rptr. 530 (1986) (artificial insemination by donor sperm allowed single woman to
have child); A 59 Year-Old Woman Becomes A Mother, USA TODAY, Jan. 7, 1994, at 11A
(egg donation enabled postmenopausal woman to become a mother).
April1996]
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nized rather than constructed by the state.2 7 The very concept of fam-
ily privacy-the constitutional doctrine protecting a "private realm of
family life which the state may not enter" 28-presupposes a "natural
family" that exists apart from and prior to the state. Implicit in this
image, but seldom articulated,2 9 is the fundamental assumption that
the natural family consists of two heterosexual parents and their bio-
logical children.3 0 This image is reinforced by the other connotation
of the word "natural," which implies that the family flows ineluctably
from biology. The legal concept of the "natural" family thus har-
nesses a word with multiple meanings, allowing each sense of the
word to strengthen and sustain the other.31
This vision of the family as the mere embodiment of biological
reality, however, becomes difficult to maintain in the face of rapid ad-
27. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977) (stating that
the natural family has "its origins entirely apart from the power of the State .... [and that]
the liberty interest in family privacy has its source, and its contours are ordinarily to be
sought, not in state law, but in intrinsic human rights"). See also Frances Olsen, The Myth
of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 835, 846 (Summer 1985) (critiqu-
ing the "'natural law' belief that the family exists as a natural human formation, not cre-
ated but merely recognized ... by the state").
28. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
29. One exception is the acknowledgement by the Supreme Court in Smith v. OF-
FER, 431 U.S. at 843, that "the usual understanding of 'family' implies biological relation-
ships, and most decisions treating the relation between parent and child have stressed this
element."
30. So deeply rooted is this image in our culture that it is often perceived as the em-
bodiment of biological reality. As anthropologist David Schneider points out:
So much of kinship and family in American culture is defined as being nature
itself, required by nature, or directly determined by nature that it is quite difficult,
often impossible, in fact, for Americans to see this as a set of cultural constructs
and not the biological facts themselves.
David Schneider, AMERICAN KINSHIP: A CULTURAL AccouNT 116 (2d ed. 1980). See also
David Schneider, A CRIIQUE OF THE STUDY OF KINSHIP 165 (1984) (stating that "there is
an assumption that is more often than not implicit, sometimes assumed to be so self-evi-
dent as to need no comment, but an assumption that is... widely held and necessary to the
study of kinship-the assumption that blood is thicker than water").
31. In the same way, the legal presumption of paternity blurs together the biological
and normative bases for fatherhood. As Professor Marjorie Shultz points out:
Paternity-by-presumption rules ... [though they] purport[ ] to be an inference
about biological fact may actually grow out of a normative aspiration and may
readily be transformed into a prescriptive command about marriage and family,
often without acknowledgment that such a transformation has taken place. The
important issue becomes not who is, but who should be having sex with the
mother: her husband. Thus the social construct, in fact normative and mutable,
draws substantial but disguised legitimacy from the representation that it simply
expresses "givens" of nature.
Marjorie Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity
for Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wisc. L. REv. 297, 317.
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vances in reproductive technology. By deconstructing parenthood
into its component parts, assisted reproductive technologies make it
possible to have at least three different biological parents-the two
gamete providers and the gestator. But when some biological
progenitors are not deemed "parents" 32 and others with no biological
connection to the child are considered "parents, '33 it becomes clear
that biological connections are neither necessary nor sufficient to form
families. Indeed, assisted reproductive technologies call into question
even the relevance of biology to the traditional paradigm. In Johnson
v. Calvert, for example, use of in vitro fertilization forced the Califor-
nia Supreme Court to determine who is the mother of a child con-
ceived from the egg of one woman but gestated in the womb of
another. 4 Such disputes between genetic and gestational mothers
graphically demonstrate that the question of motherhood cannot be
resolved by resort to biology. And if families are not "natural" enti-
ties predicated upon biological connections, then they necessarily in-
volve social choices by the state.3 5
It is true that adoption also possesses the potential to upset the
illusion that the family is a natural biological entity. This threat has
been contained, however, by a system of legal regulations that recon-
struct adoption in the image of the biological family. The central sym-
bolic event is the issuance of a new birth certificate, which inserts the
names of the adoptive parents as if they were the biological parents,
eliminating all references to the biological family.3 6 In addition, adop-
32. See, eg., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (denying parental status to
woman who gestated a child to whom she was genetically unrelated); McDonald v. Mc-
Donald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1994) (holding that egg donor was not child's mother). See also
CAL. CIV. CODE § 7005 (providing that genetic father of a child born by artificial insemina-
tion with donor sperm is not the child's father).
33. California Family Code section 7613 provides, for example, that the father of a
child created by artificial insemination of a married woman with donor sperm is the mar-
ried woman's husband. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 1996).
34. 851 P.2d at 776.
35. See Schultz, supra note 31, at 318 ("[B]oth for mothers and fathers, biological
givens and empirical facts can no longer be assumed to drive the legal assignment of paren-
tal status. [But] once biological justification is undermined, choices must be made.").
36. As Professor Bartholet observes:
Our law designs adoptive families in imitation of biology. The central symbolic
event is the issuance of a new birth certificate for the child and the sealing of the
old certificate, together with other adoption records. The goal is to ensure that
the birth parents, the child, and the adoptive parents can all proceed with their
new lives as if the child had never been born to the original parents. The central
legal event in adoption is issuance of the adoption decree, which completely sev-
ers the legal relationship between the child and the birth family, transferring to
the adoptive family all rights and responsibilities. Legally as well as symbolically,
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tive parents are often "matched" with children who resemble them in
order to mimic the biological family.37 Thus the laws regulating adop-
tion only serve to underscore the importance of biology, reinforcing
the centrality of the biological paradigm.
Of course, families were never truly "natural"-the state has al-
ways played a role in shaping them.3 8 Yet assisted reproductive tech-
nologies irretrievably expose the fact that families are not biologically
determined, but rather are socially constructed by the state. All of the
various permutations and combinations made possible by these tech-
nologies are visible evidence of the socially contingent character of
the term "family." And, by eroding the traditional conception of the
family as a "natural" biological entity, assisted reproductive technolo-
gies liberate us, leaving us free to create new meanings of family.
Second, assisted reproductive technologies destroy the dichotomy
between the family and the market. The traditional conception of the
family relies not only upon its status as a "natural" institution
grounded in biology, but also upon its opposition to the market. Un-
like the market, which assumes autonomous individuals interacting at
arms-length, the family envisions close relationships based upon ties
of love and affection.39 And unlike the market, where individuals are
it is as if the child were born to the adoptive parents. This promotes a rigid sepa-
ration of the birth from the adoptive family, reinforcing notions that the true
family is the closed nuclear family ....
Elizabeth Bartholet, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION AND THE POLrrIcs OF PARENTING 48-49
(1993).
37. Bartholet explains the way in which the matching process enshrines the biological
family:
[T]he parental screening.., process favors married couples who look as if they
could have produced the child they will adopt.... The rules for matching waiting
children with prospective parents are designed to maximize sameness and avoid
what is seen as dangerous diversity within families. Originally the goal was liter-
ally to match-to give prospective parents children with similar physical features
and mental characteristics, so that the parents could pretend to the world and
even to the child that this was their biologic child.
Id. at 49. Although this process has been tempered in recent years due to the scarcity of
healthy babies, Bartholet observes, this process "still governs with respect to those attrib-
utes deemed most important," such as one's age, race, or religion. Id. at 72.
38. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (upholding statute enacting
conclusive presumption that the husband of a child born to a married woman is the child's
father, thereby denying parental rights to biological father); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S.
248 (1983) (sustaining statute granting more procedural rights to biological mother of child
than to biological father); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (upholding state law
allowing biological mother's husband to adopt child over objection of biological father).
39. See, e.g., Judy Areen, Baby M. Reconsidered, 76 GEO. L.J. 1741 (1988) (arguing
that "surrogacy forces us to confront the differences between two of our most fundamental
institutions-the family and the market). As Professor Areen observes:
[Vol. 47
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supposed to maximize their own selfish interests, families are pre-
sumed to act as units whose members willingly sacrifice themselves for
the good of the community.40 Thus the ideology of family law as-
sumes that the family is premised upon the ethos of altruism, as op-
posed to the market, which operates upon the ethos of
individualism. 4
1
Of course, this has always been a false dichotomy: the family and
the market were never really distinct in these ways. 42 Rather, families
have long served economic functions43 and markets have often con-
The market envisions autonomous individuals trading at arms
length.... Moreover, self-interested behavior is not only acceptable in the market
but also is assumed to benefit society. In the family, by contrast, relationships are
premised on caring as much as on self-gratification.
Id at 1742. Professor Frances Olsen also describes the different assumptions underlying
the family and the market:
In contrast to the market, in which universal selfish behavior is supposed to result
in the betterment of society, the family has generally been expected to be based
on less individualistic principles. The good of all is to be achieved not by each
family member's pursuit of individual goals, but rather by sharing and sacrifice
among family members.
Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARV. L. REv. 1497, 1505 (1983) (criticizing the dichotomy between the family and the
market).
40. The premise that family members will act to further the common good is embod-
ied in our constitutional law. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) ("The law's
concept of the family rests on a presumption ... that natural bonds of affection lead par-
ents to act in the best interests of their children."); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in
the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the
state can neither supply nor hinder). This assumption, moreover, also underlies the tradi-
tional common law. For example, parents are expected and obliged by law to support their
children. See, eg., Roe v. Doe, 272 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. 1991) (enforcing parental obligation
to support child).
41. Professor Frances Olsen first coined a version of this phrase. See Olsen, supra
note 39, at 1505 ("The morality of altruism has been supposed to animate the family to the
same extent that the morality of individualism has been supposed to pervade the market-
place."). See also Areen, supra note 39, at 1744 (stating that judges must "determine
whether the market's ethic of individualism or the family's ethic of altruism will shape the
issue of surrogacy.").
42. For a good description and analysis of the market/family dichotomy, see Olsen,
supra note 39.
43. For example, the family serves as an important mechanism of property distribu-
tion. Indeed, some have argued that the family is central to capitalism. See, e.g., Friedrich
Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State, in THm MARX-ENGELS
READER 734-36 (R. Tucker ed. 1978) (arguing that the nuclear family, by enforcing monog-
amy and thereby ensuring certainty of parentage, promotes the system of private property
ownership essential to capitalism).
Along the same lines, many modem economists characterize marriage as an economic
institution that maximizes household wealth by means of the division of labor between
spouses. As Judge Richard Posner observes:
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sisted of ongoing relationships characterized by altruistic principles. 44
By fostering the free trade of sperm, eggs, and gestational services,
however, assisted reproductive technologies threaten to expose the
falsity of this dichotomy in the most obvious way. When families are
assembled by means of arms-length transactions between individuals
who purchase and sell the raw materials with which to produce a child,
this dramatically reveals the commercial nature of families, blurring
the boundary between the realm of the family and the realm of the
market.
Finally, by freeing families from biology and allowing families to
be formed in the marketplace, assisted reproductive technologies
move us closer towards a world of private ordering, where not only
the form but also the content and the extent of family obligations may
become the product of individual choice. At the present time, family
obligations automatically and inevitably follow biological connec-
tions.45 Assisted reproductive technologies, however, create families
as a matter of individual agreement, moving towards a model of con-
tractual parenthood. Once again, Johnson v. Calvert best exemplifies
this phenomenon with its holding that motherhood is to be deter-
[T]he family facilitates the division of labor, yielding gains from specialization. In
the traditional family the husband specializes in some market employment (for
example, engineering) that yields income that can be used to purchase the market
commodities needed as inputs into the final production of the household, while
the wife devotes her time to processing market commodities (for example, grocer-
ies) into household output (for example, dinner). By specializing in production
for the market the husband maximizes the family's money income with which to
buy the market commodities that the family needs. By specializing in household
production the wife maximizes the value of her time as an input into the produc-
tion of the household's output. The division of labor-the husband working full-
time in the job market, the wife full-time in the household-operates to maximize
the total real income of the household by enabling husband and wife to specialize
in complementary activities.
Richard Posner, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 140 (4th ed. 1992). See also Gary S. Becker,
A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 3-4 (1991) (arguing that marriage is a device for efficient
household production).
44. For the view that commercial transactions are not isolated events between atomis-
tic individuals, but instead typically occur in the context of ongoing relationships, see, e.g.,
Ian Macneil, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRAC: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN CONTRACTUAL
RELATIONS (1980) and Stewart Macaulay, Elegant Models, Empirical Pictures, and the
Complexities of Contract, 11 L. & Soc. REv. 507 (1977).
45. Thus, fathers possess the duty to support their biological offspring even when con-
ception occurred without their knowledge or consent. See, e.g., Hughes v. Hutt, 455 A.2d
623 (Pa. 1982); Pamela P. v. Frank S., 88 A.D.2d 865 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982); Stephen K. v.
Roni L., 105 Cal. App. 3d (1980).
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mined according to the parties' intentions.46 State statutes governing
artificial insemination with donor sperm also effectuate individual in-
tent by expressly requiring a husband's consent in order to establish
his fatherhood.47
But biological bonds, because reflexive and irrevocable, may
prove more reliable than voluntarily assumed contractual commit-
ments.48 When family members come together as a matter of choice,
on the other hand, their commitment to each other may accordingly
become both contingent and revocable. Although voluntary agree-
ments enhance individual autonomy, they also threaten to produce
conditional parents whose sense of duty is limited to and contingent
upon performance of the contract. Thus, in at least two instances, the
parties to a surrogacy contract initially rejected children born with
medical problems.49 Moreover, parenthood by consent may en-
courage the attitude that family relationships can be freely entered
and exited, accepted or rejected.50 This appears to be the reasoning of
46. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (1993). See also Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588
(Tenn. 1992) (holding, in a battle between divorcing spouses for custody of seven frozen
embryos, that husband's intent not to procreate outside marriage should prevent his invol-
untarily becoming a father).
47. See; e.g., CAT. FAM. CODE § 7613 (West 1996) ("If, under the supervision of a
licensed physician and with the consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially
with semen donated by a man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were
the natural father of a child thereby conceived.") (emphasis added).
48. In the words of David Schneider.
Because "Blood Is Thicker Than Water," kinship consists in bonds on which kins-
men can depend and which are compelling and stronger than, and take priority
over, other kinds of bonds. These bonds are in principle unquestioned and un-
questionable. They are states of being, not of doing or performance-that is, the
grounds for the bonds "exist" or they do not, the bond of kinship "is" or "is not,"
it is not contingent or conditional, and performance is presumed to follow auto-
matically if the bond "exists."
David Schneider, A CarioQu OF THE Sruy OF KINSHP 165-66.
49. In 1983, Christopher Ray Stiver was born suffering from a severe strep infection
and microcephaly, a congenital disorder usually associated with mental retardation. The
contracting father refused to consent to medical treatment and disclaimed responsibility
for the child. Only when paternity tests, revealed to the parties on the Phil Donahue tele-
vision show, indicated that the husband of the surrogate was the genetic father, did the
biological parent's agree to accept the child. See Areen, supra note 39, at 1747 & n.28.
A similar case arose in 1986, when a woman with a history of drug abuse that was not
known to her family contracted to become a surrogate mother for her sister. At birth, the
child tested positive for the HIIV antibody, and all parties refused custody. See id. at 1747
& n.29.
50. See Carl Schneider, Surrogate Motherhood from the Perspective of Family Law, 13
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 125, 131 (1990) [hereinafter Schneider, Surrogate Motherhood]
(stating that surrogacy is troubling because it "seem[s] likely to weaken the sense of auto-
matic and ineradicable commitment between family members."); Katherine Bartlett, Re-
Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 295 (1988) (arguing that "the law should focus
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John Buzzanca, who with his wife Luanne commissioned a gestational
surrogate to carry to term an embryo produced from anonymously
donated eggs and sperm. One month before the baby was born, how-
ever, Buzzanca filed for divorce and repudiated his obligations to the
child. Buzzanca based his refusal to pay child support upon the fact
that he was not the child's biological father, but a court has since ruled
that Buzzanca owes child support because he participated in the
child's conception by signing the surrogacy contract. 51 Thus the priva-
tization of the family is not without risks for children.5 2
Paradoxically, the families formed with the assistance of repro-
ductive technology, though driven by a belief in the importance of
biology, ultimately undermine the significance of biological ties. In so
doing, they expose the state's involvement in the creation of families,
they blur the boundary between the family and the market, and they
promote the privatization of the family. Thus, assisted reproductive
technologies do not simply transform the ways in which we create
families. More fundamentally, they transform our very understanding
of the term "family."
upon parental responsibility rather than reciprocal 'rights,' and express a view of
parenthood based upon the cycle of gift rather than the cycle of exchange.").
51. See Tony Saavedra, The Most Unusual Case In History of Surrogacy, S.F. EXAM-
INER, Feb. 18, 1996, at A2.
52. See generally Jana Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 Wisc. L. REv.
1443 (describing and evaluating the process whereby private norms and decisionmaking
have supplanted state-imposed rules and structures for governing families in a variety of
areas).
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